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China’s One Child Policy: 
Examining the Origins and Outcomes Ignored by the Media 
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On June 20, 2004, the National Geographic channel released China’s Lost Daughters, a 
short, forty minute documentary that followed the adoption process of several American families 
as they traveled to China. Although the documentary relied most heavily on the pathos of 
viewers rather than specific research or hard data, the film nevertheless brought increased 
scrutiny to the social issues plaguing the world’s most populous country. The conflict in question 
was China’s controversial one child policy, a massive government attempt to slow population 
growth by limiting couples to one child. Soon, a brief flurry of media attention spawned 
headlines such as Toronto Star’s “A Crying Shame” or PBS’s Between Two Worlds. But long 
after these frenzied headlines, sociologists, anthropologists, and other scholars around the world 
continued to examine what was really happening in China. Although it was easy for the media to 
hastily arrive at sweeping conclusions and broadcast their dramatic assumptions, thorough 
research indicates that China’s one child policy was the culmination a government desperate to 
avoid economic distress as a result of an unbounded population. While the one child policy 
successfully decreased fertility rates and achieved a more manageable population, western media 
obsessed over the policy’s multitude of inadvertent complications such as increased rates of 
human trafficking, prostitution, and widespread gendercide. Only in historical retrospect can this 
policy’s necessity be challenged, as evidence suggests that the population may have stabilized 
regardless of the heavy-handed communist action.  
A Communist Foundation for Family Planning 
Few media outlets explored the past events that led China to such a radical policy 
decision. To fully understand the origins of the one child policy, one must travel long before its 
formal implementation in 1979. The twentieth century was a transformational period for 
numerous countries. Britain lost India─ the “crown diamond” of her colonies─ as well as various 
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other spheres of influence around the globe. The Ottoman Empire ceased to exist, and Russia’s 
last Czar was executed, ushering in the beginning of Bolshevik rule. China was no exception to 
this global turmoil. China’s last Qing emperor Pu Yi was overthrown by Mao Zedong, marking a 
monumental shift from the ancient tradition of dynastic rule to communism. But even the 
communist rulers could not deny the sheer scale of the country they now ruled. Discounting 
Antarctica, China boasts the third largest landmass of all countries in the world and the largest 
population. Data from the United Nations Census Bureau shows that China’s population was 
approximately 565 million in 1950, just one year after Mao’s official ascension to power. Life 
expectancy was bleak, at just 40.1 years for the average adult (UN). The sheer size and scale of 
China and her troubles suggested to Mao that intervention had to occur on a more private, 
intimate level.   
Efforts to bolster the population aligned with Mao’s belief that a large population was 
necessary to reflect the political and economic power of China. This philosophy is hard to grasp 
when the Chinese government now holds the polar opposite position. Indeed, Mao would 
continue to exaggerate success in order to fulfill his vision of a massive labor force capable of 
world domination and success (Riley 11). Mao’s vision for the country included making 
significant advancements in agriculture and manufacturing, which he hoped would propel 
towards a more prestigious role on the global stage. The implementation of government funded 
healthcare programs lowered the death rate from 35 to 14 per one thousand people by 1953 
(Riley 6). These minor programs had relatively small, local aims. Healthcare personnel received 
formal training and municipal crews worked to clean up neighborhoods. Inexpensive yet 
relatively successful, these efforts are believed to be responsible for the slight improvement in 
living conditions during the early post-revolution days (Riley 6). However, scholars are acutely 
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aware that the statistics indicating dramatic improvement in mortality rates may be unreliable 
due to the regime’s tendency to idealize its success. Nancy E. Riley, a professor of Sociology at 
Bowdoin University, points out that mortality data was “chronically underestimated” (Riley 7).1   
Sustaining Then Containing 
Before Mao turned to more serious measures of population control, Mao attempted to 
focus on agriculture as an initial means of sustaining the population. Regardless of imprecise 
data provided by the regime, historians agree that the initial introduction of Mao’s policies did 
bring a period of general improvement. Unfortunately, this brief period was soon eclipsed by the 
most infamously disastrous effort known as the Great Leap Forward. Launched in 1958, Mao 
reorganized Chinese land into a series of communes in which land was no longer owned 
individually (Garside 14). A typical commune held about 5,000 families, all of whom gave up 
their ownership of tools, equipment, and housing to be used communally. By the end of 1958, 
the total reorganization of Chinese society was complete. Initially, production of lumber, coal, 
and steel all rose. This early triumph prompted Mao to push unreasonable quotas that 
overworked the Chinese peasantry starting in 1959. Total disaster ensued (Garside 26). Cheap 
machinery broke quickly and the increased attention to raw manufacturing meant that only 170 
million tons of grain were produced (Riley 12). Historians know that this amount was nowhere 
near enough to feed China’s residents, and the World Health Organization concludes that nearly 
30 million people died of starvation between 1958 and 1961. Although China was able to 
rebound by 1964, even Mao himself admitted to the failure of the program, and in a famously 
cited quote, Mao stated, “The chaos caused was on a grand scale, and I take responsibility” 
(Moody 127). Peter Moody Jr., a professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame, 
                                                          
1
 Riley’s research focuses on family, gender, and population trends in China and is published in her most famous 
paper “China’s Population: New Trends and Challenges”. Her estimates suggest that a death rate closer to twenty 
per one thousand people is a more accurate picture of the Chinese standard of living in 1953. 
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explains that this mistake cost Mao his title as Head of State. Deng Xiaoping became the leader 
of China and reversed many of Mao’s communist policies.  
The famine caused by the Great Leap Forward also caused officials to reverse their initial 
position on population growth. Realizing that limited resources could only provide for so many 
people, the government began to instate family planning campaigns throughout China. The 
strategy of choice was no longer sustaining the population, but containing it. Smaller efforts to 
control family sizes had already been established since the mid-1950s, but these efforts 
“highlighted fertility control efforts in the name of maternal and infant health” (Riley 11). The 
renewed effort to control the population was much more urgent, as the second family planning 
control involved much more direct means of communication between families and the 
government. The government sought to make abortion and birth control more accessible. Special 
attention was focused on rural families, where the government attempted to convince individuals 
that it would be beneficial to have smaller families. The government advised an older marriage 
age for both men and women. Encouragement to have children later and less often became 
widespread. In urban areas, this campaign was remarkably successful; fertility rates in urban 
areas dropped to 2.1 (Hongbin 15).2 However, efforts in the rural areas were not as successful. 
Fertility rates remained fairly constant at well over 6.0. Li Hongbin, a professor at Tsinghua 
University, attributes the stable trend to the lack of resources available to individual rural 
families. Furthermore, rural families were much more reliant on children as farmhands, so 
embracing the idea of small families seemed antithetical to the productivity of family farms. This 
key difference would only amplify as officials took more and more drastic measures to control 
the population. 
                                                          
2
 Fertility rates are measured by the average number of children a woman will bear in a lifetime.  
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Although Mao had been removed from his position because of the Great Leap Forward’s 
failure, many citizens still admired Mao, and Mao used this popularity to incite the masses 
during the 1966 Cultural Revolution. Mao began to regain power within the government by 
purging the party of people he believed too sympathetic to capitalism. Mao’s cult of personality 
inspired hundreds of thousands of young people, many of them students, to take to the streets in 
support of his return to power. Mao praised rebellion and encouraged the Red Guard to be the 
effectors of his cleansing campaign. Mao declared, “You young people, full of vigor and vitality, 
are in the bloom of life, like the sun at eight or nine in the morning. Our hope is placed on you ... 
The world belongs to you. China's future belongs to you” (Moody 128). However, below the 
surface of Mao’s façade, Mao knew that population control was now a necessity.  
Mao renewed these efforts in early 1970. Much like the previous effort, government 
officials encouraged families to minimize family size to one or two children. Particular attention 
was paid to rural families. Abortion services and other contraceptives became widely available 
and added tangible pressure to couples. Mao also instructed that specific quotas should be met in 
order to manage the expanding population. Mao even gave the new campaign the slogan wan, xi, 
shao or “later, longer, fewer” (Riley 12). By 1970, the fertility rate in China dropped below 6.0, 
indicating that even rural areas were responding well to the public campaigns. This number still 
did not satisfy Mao. Historians believe that his passionate desire to decrease the fertility rates 
inspired the creation of the one child policy and its stringent requirements (Riley 13). However, 
his death in 1976 meant he would never see the final stages of his family planning policies 
implemented.  
Mao’s successor, Deng Xiaoping would continue Mao’s vision for the country’s 
population. Although Deng reformed many economic and political policies that turned away 
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from Mao’s ideology, his family planning rules would remain tight. Mao’s targeted limits were 
adopted by Deng and tightened. The fertility rate in China was still declining steadily, hitting a 
record low around 3.2 in 1977 (UN). Social scientists who have studied this trend, such as Liu 
Zheng, generally agree that, regardless of the 1979 one child policy, China would have reached 
the fertility rate of 2.0 by 1980 (Riley 21). What truly cemented this reality, however, was 
Deng’s announcement of the one child policy with a resounding speech of encouragement. 
Sociologist and professor Susan E. Short describes the various methods Deng sanctioned in her 
essay, “Looking Locally at One Child Policy.” Deng demanded a specific and thorough 
organization of the program, leading to a troubling rate of effectiveness in its implementation.  
Incentives, punishments, public education, and intervention on the private level were all 
means of enforcement. Such complex organization took until at least 1981 to become fully 
instituted. However, reports of forced sterilization or abortions were already surfacing3. Women 
faced extreme scrutiny by local officials and lost ownership of their bodies under this policy. If 
this coercion was not enough to subdue a family into obedience, incentives and punishments 
were additional ways the government leveled power over the family unit. Short notes that 
“Incentives were given to couples who pledged to limit their families to one child, and couples 
who had three or more births were penalized” (Short 374). Initially, second births were 
discouraged, not penalized. This policy was reversed by 1982, and second births were also 
penalized. Incentives or punishments often took the form of monetary compensations or fines. 
However, as the urgency of the policy increased, documentation shows that fines became 
subjective to the whims of the local officials. Cash subsidies varied from province to province, 
but a median sum of forty yuan was the baseline amount. This grew over time to almost sixty-
eight yuan by 1991 and seventy-three yuan by 1993 in rural areas. In urban areas, this sum 
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 Hongbin cites an estimate near 30 million when counting the number of these instances. 
Miller 8 
 
remained stagnant once it decreased to approximately 38 yuan by 1991 (Short 375). These 
numbers quantified human life and unsympathetically placed children at the center of the 
policy’s harshest consequences. 
Rural vs. Urban Enforcement 
Although the draconian methods of intimidation have always incited the most passionate 
of responses from the global community, not all provinces in China used an identical formula of 
implementation, a nuance almost always missed by the media. Short’s article also emphasizes 
that the one child policy was somewhat dynamic, as not all areas had a similar experience under 
the new law. Her paper explores the various ways each province responded to the policy. The 
data her article provides comes from the China Health and Nutrition Survey taken three separate 
times in 1989, 1991, and 1993. Eight different provinces participated in this survey: Liaoning, 
Jiangsu, Shandong, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi, and Guizhou. All of these provinces are 
autonomous and recognized nationally as entities of China4. The survey sought to discover 
whether exceptions were allowed based on gender, disabilities of the child, or special parental 
conditions such as a special occupation.  
By comparing all three surveys, clear patterns began to emerge. First, rural areas were 
consistently more relaxed in their enforcement of the one child policy. Exceptions were granted 
on all three levels with relative regularity. In 1989, a rural couple had a 64.9% chance of being 
allowed a second child if their first child was a girl. Contrastingly, an urban couple in 1989 had 
only an 18.9% chance. Second, as the years passed, strict adherence became more common, and 
exceptions were granted less willingly. For instance, the rate of pardons being granted to rural 
couples with a firstborn daughter dropped from 64.9% in 1989 to 58.8% in 1991. For urban 
                                                          
4
 Specific clarifications are given in order to establish a distinction between disputed regions such as Tibet, whose 
demographic information is often included in Chinese statistical values, and uncontested regions such as 
Guangdong.  
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couples, the rate dropped to 9.4%. Interestingly, exceptions were almost always given to rural 
couples whose first child had a disability (97.4% chance of being granted a pardon). In urban 
areas, however, a child with disabilities did not afford couples a strong enough reason to avoid 
punishment if a second child was born. Having never broadcast considerations such as these, the 
media vilified the country as a whole and reduced the complexity of the true nature of the policy.  
The continued discrepancy between rural and urban reflects the massive cultural and 
economic differences between rural and urban families. Rural families, who traditionally have 
always relied on children as a direct means of livelihood received a more relaxed interpretation 
of the one child policy. Here, consideration was clearly given to the more important role children 
played in the economic stability of the community. In urban areas, where enforcement was much 
stricter, Short explains that the decreased emphasis on children as a necessary means of 
wellbeing resulted in less leniency. Here the increased access to education and health facilities 
was thought to compensate for the tighter regulation. Urban areas were also much more likely to 
receive punishments as opposed to incentives. Rural residents could be offered better housing, 
land, or even extra food rations (Short 378). No such provisions were generally offered to urban 
individuals. This difference again emphasizes the vast problem China has always faced when 
reconciling a huge rural peasantry with a growing urban population.  
Infanticide, Girls Missing by the Millions 
However difficult it was to accommodate both urban and rural ways of life, the most 
troubling part of the narrative surrounding the one child policy arrived with reports of 
widespread infanticide, the systematic and selective murder of newborns, specifically infant 
girls. Although precise rates of infanticide are understandably difficult to procure with accuracy, 
the undeniable imbalance of males and females provides an excellent place to begin. Even before 
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the one child policy, the male population outnumbered females by nearly 18.5 million (Rajan 
2503). By 1982, china lacked 30.7 million females to balance the sex ratio, and by 1990, this 
number grew to 328.9 million. Rajan’s statistics indicate that “the destruction of female infants 
seems to be most common in the southern part of China and specially[sic] in some provinces in 
which the Chinese themselves regarded it as a terrible and a threatening evil” (Rajan 2503). 
Statistical evidence supports this claim, as rural areas such as the Hunan and Guangxi provinces 
recorded some of the most extreme ratios at nearly 111.36 and 110.65 males per 100 females 
(Rajan 2504). Rajan defines a healthy sex ratio at birth to be around 105 males to 100 females. 
While some variance is always to be expected, the most troubling part about this ratio is that it 
does not balance out with time.  
In striving to maintain a strong family by preferring a son, rural communities have 
created an especially terrible catch-22 situation for themselves. If rural families decide to settle 
for a daughter, they risk struggling in the day to day operation of the farm and, later, security in 
their elderly age. However, if they selectively abort or abandon baby girls and raise a son, their 
community is at risk of deterioration due to the migration patterns of the young men who leave 
their village to find a wife. Rajan’s painfully descriptive explanation hits the heart of the matter. 
Namely, it is the individuals who suffer most for the sake of the state. A great sacrifice must be 
made either way in order to fulfill the duty to the country.  
To explain the obvious preference both rural and urban communities placed on males, 
author Mary Gallaher urges her audience to understand the deeply rooted Confucian values in 
Chinese culture. Confucianism places women at the bottom of the social hierarchy. Much like 
western traditions of patriarchy, women in China were instructed to be loyal to the domestic 
sphere and all its tasks (Curtin 90). However, Gallagher does mention that there were some 
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anomalies to this pattern, as there is extensive documentation of some women writing poetry or 
managing property, but these cases were rare and make up the exception, not the standard. 
Women showed respect by having complete obedience to husbands and fathers. Confucius 
compared the natural, hierarchical relationship of ruler and subject to the natural relationship of 
husband and wife. Never was a women expected or anticipated to be free and autonomous. Of 
course, this similarity to Western models is no real surprise, as the emphasis on manual labor in a 
predominantly agricultural society would naturally tend to value males. Although Gallagher 
recognizes the shock value in the very idea of infanticide, she urges readers to adjust to look at 
the issue through a lens other than Western culture. While the United States certainly recognizes 
the prevalence of patriarchy and other institutionalized forms of gender bias, readers must realize 
that the average individual in China does not have a notion of analyzing, much less questioning 
these concepts. 
This logical, though still oppressive trend, is further affirmed by even contemporary data 
provided previously by Rajan. If an agricultural society did indeed emphasize males, gender 
disparities should be much greater in rural areas. This trend can easily be witnessed and 
corroborated again using Rajan’s data. Furthermore, urban areas in post-1990 census data 
demonstrate that male preference is in fact declining, as the sex ratio tends to be much more 
even, though still not ideal. Gallagher’s analysis of the relationship between urbanization and 
sexual preference reveals that a number of factors allow urban centers to value women. First, the 
physical deficiencies of a women are much less consequential when survival is not based on the 
quality of manual labor. Because of this, demographers such as Gallagher believe that the 
increasing rate of extreme urbanization in China has and will provide a buffer to any further 
exaggeration of an already disproportionate sex ratio. Second, urbanization also offered 
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significant exposure to Westernized opinion, which decried the treatment of girls under the new 
policy. Urban areas also mean a greater possibility of education, which, being state sanctioned 
did not in theory promote either sex to be of greater or value. In fact, realizing the inadvertent 
gender imbalance the one-child policy had caused, additional efforts were made to encourage 
families to keep first born daughters and even provide money as compensation (Gallagher 100). 
These observations begin to dismantle support or the one child policy, suggesting that internal 
mindsets began to shift towards a patchwork of triage.  
Further evidence of futility is explored in Sun Yuesheng’s article, “The One Child Policy 
in China Today,” looks at sex ratios, fertility rates, and other statistics to determine if the one 
child policy was effective and if it continues to be necessary or worthwhile. Yuesheng states that 
any measurement of efficiency is naturally subjective, and therefore approaches the question 
cautiously and logically. He first evaluates the trend in the total living space each individual 
possessed. He defines living space not merely as uninhabited, arable land, but as a physical 
housing structure available for residency. In 1987, he found that a rural individual in China could 
expect to have approximately 4.3 square meters. In urban areas, living space per individual was 
approximately 4.5 square meters. In light of the rapid urbanization taking place, officials feared 
that allowing the fertility rate to remain anywhere above 2.0 would result in disastrous 
overcrowding. Chinese officials wanted the policy to prevent excess population growth beyond 
1.2 billion by the year 2000. A quick analysis of effectiveness would then deem the policy 
ineffective; the goal was not met and the Chinese population exceeded 1.2 billion by more than 
42 million in 2000.  
A general consensus exists amongst the scientific community that questions whether the 
one child policy is directly responsible for improvements that numbers indicate. In the early 
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1960s, the fertility rate in China was six children per woman. By 2001, this number dropped to 
1.7. Never has any country succeeded in producing such startling results (Yuesheng 313). 
Average family income, educational accomplishment, and healthcare opportunities have all 
improved under the one-child policy as well. The policy was also effective in reducing higher 
order births, or births that produce the third, fourth, etc. child in a family. In 1973, first births 
made up only 21% of all births in the country. By 2000, first births made up almost 68% of all 
births (Yuesheng 313). Yueshing believes that the trend of urbanization and adoption of western-
style family planning would have reduced the number of children to two per couple regardless of 
the one child policy. Essentially, the one child policy was merely an accelerator of a process that 
had already begun in the early 1970s.  
Dr. Mark R. Rosenzweig and Dr. Junsen Zhang explore this very possibility and find that 
the one child policy may be able to take very little credit for the successes traditionally attributed 
its existence. They cite a survey taken in 2005 which asked couples how many children they 
would like to have. A general response of one to two children confirmed suspicions that modern 
couples needed little pressure to decide on a smaller family. When pushed to explain their 
rationale, many couples responded with answers that mirror the very reasons the government 
continues to enforce the one child policy. Rosenzweig and Zhang concluded that the political 
attitude of caution in numbers has successfully been transferred to the family environment; 
Chinese families now see the scarcity of space and resources and feel compelled to respond. 
Rosenzweig and Zhang muse that such a minimal desire for large families “fulfills the 
government’s dream” (Rosenzweig 1164). Most profound is the professors’ confidence in 
suggesting that an appropriate sex ratio could have been maintained without the decision to 
execute the one child policy at the expense of thousands of lives. 
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Yet, because of the affirmative decision, China must now contend with the plethora of 
issues the one-child policy has spawned. These issues include a huge gulf that is growing 
between the number of marriage-eligible men and women. Projections from the 2000 census 
suggest that as many as 30 million men will be unable to find a partner by the year 2020 (UN). 
Psychologists have noted that this shortage has increased competition in men, leading to higher 
homicide and assault rates between males in the last decade. Additionally, they have also noted 
an increase in drug and alcohol abuse, which are often classic trademarks of communities with 
an excess of men (Rosenzweig 1167). Other problems documented by the World Health 
Organization and Polaris Project include increased human trafficking of women, specifically, 
kidnapping and sex trafficking due to the shortage of available brides. 
Although Chinese officials certainly did not plan for the social burden the one child 
policy caused, it seems impossible to reconcile the positive statistics with the reality of the 
policy’s simultaneous but unintended flaws. The policy was an urgent attempt to fix an 
increasing population pressure to improve the long term future. The sacrifices made on an 
individual level for the greater community merely reflect the political and ideological philosophy 
that has always existed and emphasized the whole rather than the part. When combined with the 
greater value placed on men in a patriarchal society in general, it can be no surprise that women 
and girls suffered most during its initial phase. Contrastingly, it is now young men that will feel 
more and more negative pressure from the one child policy.  
The clear violation of human rights as western philosophy perceives it is reason enough 
to raise concerns and objections. However, to vehemently disparage such a large-scale, yet 
paradoxically personal, effort seems equally inappropriate. The world witnessed self-denial in a 
way that could never be observed in a nation whose people themselves proclaim the ideal—the 
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right—of freedom. No amount of speculation can truly change the fact that the Chinese 
accomplished a spectacular feat of population control, however terrible. Their sacrifice is 
solemnly touching, and when the policy is eventually reversed, as the population growth is 
expected to reach zero5, it will be a testament to the magnitude of gore that accompanies any 
great glory.  
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 Projected estimate provided by Rosenzweig and Zhang 
Miller 16 
 
Works Cited 
Gallagher, Mary. “Women and Gender.” Chinese Culture through the Family. Ed. Howard 
Giskin and Bettye S. Walsh. New York: State University Press, 2001. 89-105. Print. 13 
March 2014. 
Garside, Roger. Coming Alive. San Francisco: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1981. Print. 8  
March 2014.  
Hongbin, Li, Junjian Yi and Junsen Zhang. “Estimating the Effect of the One-Child Policy on the  
Sex Ratio Imbalance in China: Identification Based on the Difference-in-Differences.”  
Demography 48.4. (November 2011): 1-23. Print. 8 March 2014.  
Moody, Peter R. Jr. Chinese Politics after Mao: Development and Liberalization 1976-1983.  
New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983. Print. 8 March 2014.  
Rajan, Irudaya S. “China’s One-Child Policy: Implication for Population Aging.” Economic and  
Political Weekly 29.38. (1994): 2502-2506. Print. 14 March 2014. 
Riley, Nancy E. “China’s Population: New Trends and Challenges.” Population Bulletin 59.2.  
(2004): 1-36. Print. 15 March 2014. 
Rosenzweig, Mark R. and Junsen Zhang. “Do Population Control Policies Induce More Human  
Capital Investment? Twins, Birthweight and China’s “One-Child” Policy.” The Review of  
Economic Studies 76.3. (2009): 1149-1174. Print. 18 March 2014.  
Short, Susan E and Zhai Fengying. “Looking Locally at China’s One-Child Policy.” Studies in  
Family Planning 29.4. (1998): 373-397. Print. 16 March 2014.  
United Nations (UN), World Population Prospects: the 2002 Revision (2003). United Nations  
Census Bureau, International Database. Web. </www.census.gov/ipc/>. 
World Health Organization (WHO). China. World Health Organization, 2014. Web. 17 March  
         2014. </http://www.who.int/countries/chn/en/>.  
Yueshing, Sun and Wei Zhangling. “The One Child Policy in China Today.” Journal of  
         Comparative Family Studies 18.2. (1997): 309-25. Print. 18 March 2014.  
Zheng, Liu and Li Jianbao. “Characteristics and Priorities of China’s Population Control From                   
an International Perspective.” Chinese Journal Population of Science 5.2. (1993): 107-118. Print. 
14 March 2014.  
 
